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What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?
Abstract
This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs).
Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers
made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of the start-
up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high-
reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10–14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs' “extra-financial”
value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These extra-financial
services can have financial consequences.
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This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of 
reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-
ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing 
VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of 
the start-up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times 
more likely to be accepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 
10 to 14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs’ “extra-financial” value may 
be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These 
extra-financial services can have financial consequences. 
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A central issue for early-stage high-tech entrepreneurs is obtaining external resources when the 
assets of their start-up are intangible and knowledge-based. Particularly for entrepreneurs 
without an established reputation, convincing external resource providers such as venture 
capitalists to provide financial capital may be challenging. The literature contains two main lines 
of research for overcoming this problem. One research stream has concentrated on designing 
institutional structures to permit financing early stage ventures. This contractual- and 
monitoring-based approach is aimed at solving potential agency problems between investors and 
entrepreneurs (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Lerner (1995), Hellmann (1998), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2001, 2002, and 2003)). A second research stream has suggested that when the 
quality of a start-up cannot be directly observed, external actors rely on the quality of the start-
up’s affiliates as a signal of the start-up’s own quality (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Biglaiser (1993), and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)). This certification-based approach may 
help legitimate start-ups and entrepreneurs without a prior track record.  
While the first research stream emphasizes the venture capitalist’s problem (designing the 
appropriate mechanisms), the second highlights the entrepreneur’s problem more directly 
(affiliating with highly reputable partners), and serves as an antecedent to this study. VC 
certification value, together with their value-added services such as recruiting executive 
managers (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), have led analysts in the descriptive literature to write: “It 
is far more important whose money you get [as an entrepreneur] than how much you get or how 
much you pay for it” (Bygrave and Timmons (1992, p. 208)) and “From whom you raise capital 
is often more important than the terms” (Sahlman (1997, p. 107)). These views clearly indicate 
that VCs have different value-added potential and that venture capital represents more than strict 
financial capital to entrepreneurs. In contrast, the extant academic literature has not emphasized 
VC heterogeneity, implicitly treating VCs as one uniform class so that reputation differences 
among VCs are obscured (see Gompers (1996) and Kaplan and Schoar (2003) for exceptions). 
As well, whereas much of the previous literature has concentrated on the benefits to certification 
(e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)), the costs of 
affiliating with prominent actors have not been systematically analyzed empirically. For 
example, the prescriptive advice to start-up entrepreneurs of affiliating with the highest status 
partner possible (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels) seems strong given that calculations of returns to 
such action that do not take into account the costs of affiliation may be overstated. Indeed, 
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demand for affiliation with reputable actors is likely to vary with the cost of such association. 
More generally, because affiliation with reputable partners confers performance benefits, such 
association cannot be freely accessed, for otherwise certification agents would not have 
incentives to invest in acquiring a reputation in the first place (Shapiro (1983)).1  
Consequently, this article explores two interlinked questions: Is there a market for 
affiliation with reputable partners? If so, what are the prices for such affiliation? Entrepreneurial 
demand for affiliation with venture capitalists provides an excellent empirical setting to explore 
these questions for two reasons. First, because VCs can certify and start-ups need to be certified, 
the exchange nature of the relationship provides a natural marketplace for affiliation. Secondly, 
due to the tremendous increase in the supply of venture capital in the second half of the 1990s,2 
the situation of “money chasing deals” makes observing a menu of price offers by VCs with 
varying reputation more likely—a necessary condition for identifying the market for affiliation. 
The empirical analysis investigates proxies for VC reputation which explain the variation 
in offers accepted and valuations offered to start-ups at a point in time, while holding start-up 
characteristics fixed. To implement this methodology, I developed a novel, hand-collected 
dataset of 148 financing offers (both those accepted and declined) made to a group of 51 early 
stage high-tech start-ups. The estimated effects are both statistically and economically 
significant. A financing offer from a high reputation VC is approximately three times more likely 
to be accepted by an entrepreneur. As well, highly reputable VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10 
to 14% discount. 
The empirical results suggest that entrepreneurs are willing to forego offers with higher 
valuations in order to affiliate with more reputable venture capitalists. These results are 
consistent with the idea that venture capitalists act as more than strict financial intermediaries, 
placing funds from investors to capital-constrained start-ups. If this were not the case, we might 
expect entry by suppliers of entrepreneurial finance to equilibrate prices for start-up equity 
across offers to a given firm. However, if VCs differed in the bundle of services and certification 
they provide to their portfolio companies, which might be thought of as “extra-financial” VC 
                                                          
1 The extant research on the market for certification has only established general bounds. Statements on the supply 
of certification have generally been limited to an acknowledgment that such suppliers will not want to provide 
affiliation to entities that will damage their reputations (Podolny (1993)). Likewise, on the demand side, screening 
theories would argue that only those organizations that will benefit most from certification will accept the terms of a 
stringent supply contract (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg (2001, 2003)). 
2 Disbursements to start-ups from VCs, which totaled just $665M in 1980 and $2.3B in 1990, skyrocketed to over 
$100B in 2000 (National Venture Capital Association Yearbook (2001)). 
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functions, then prices for affiliation might differ. This implies that the VC information network 
and its certification value may be more distinctive than their financial capital, and so these extra-
financial VC functions can have financial consequences—namely, the price at which VCs are 
able to acquire equity in a given start-up. Indeed, this view is consistent with the stylized fact 
that VCs experience substantial inter-industry variation in financial performance (Kaplan and 
Schoar (2003)). Consequently, future research exploring variation within the VC industry, 
especially as it relates to organizational performance, would be interesting.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the relevant prior 
literature and derives hypotheses about the entrepreneurial market for VC affiliation. Section II 
describes the methodology and data used to test these hypotheses. Empirical results are discussed 
in Section III, while a final section concludes with a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the study. 
 
I. Literature and Hypothesis Development 
This section starts with a discussion of reputation as an economic good, develops the 
notion of a market for affiliation, and concludes with hypotheses about the demand for VC 
affiliation by early stage start-ups.  
 
A. Reputation and Affiliation as Economic Goods 
 Reputation, which results from prior experience and performance, has been identified as 
an economically important asset that can generate future rents when information among actors is 
asymmetric (e.g., Shapiro (1983) and Biglaiser (1993)). Starting with Spence (1974), there has 
been a sizeable theoretical literature on the phenomenon of actors without an established 
reputation signaling quality to the external market. For example, Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) 
present a theory of Veblen effects in which people engage in conspicuous consumption because 
material displays of relative wealth signal social status.  
 A related strand of research suggests that performance benefits can be realized by the 
reputable producer’s affiliates through a process of certification. This phenomenon has been 
examined in the context of reputable investment banks and venture capitalists and the pricing of 
initial public offerings (Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991)). These 
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agents can credibly stake their reputations on the claim that the IPOs they back are not 
overpriced as a result of their repeated interactions with external parties.  
More generally, for a certification to be effective, it must fulfill three conditions: (1) The 
certifying agent must have reputational capital at stake that would be compromised with an 
invalid certification; (2) the certifying agent’s reputational capital must exceed the largest one-
time wealth transfer from a mis-certification; and (3) the certified target must face a cost of 
leasing the reputational capital of the certifying agent (Booth and Smith (1986)). This final 
condition is an important one for insuring that the certifying agent would have the proper 
incentives to invest in its own reputation. Unfortunately, it has not received much empirical 
attention; consequently it is this market for “leasing” reputational capital (and the associated 
prices for doing so) that forms the core of the empirical analysis in this paper. 
Venture capitalists meet the three previously stated criteria of certifying agents and can 
therefore be suppliers of certification (Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Start-ups, especially those 
in the early stages, often do not have an established reputation, and may therefore demand 
certification. Individual start-ups do not have repeated interactions with organizations associated 
with exiting an investment (e.g., acquiring firms or investment bankers), and therefore do not 
build a reputation in this community. In the market for affiliation, the supply of financial capital 
(and attention) from reputable venture capitalists is limited. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity 
in the demand for such association, because entrepreneurs have both different initial endowments 
of resources and reputation, as well as different expectations of the marginal benefit of 
affiliation.  
The market for affiliation is reflected in prices offered by VCs and accepted by 
entrepreneurs in the exchange of start-up equity for venture capital. Moreover, the price that VCs 
pay to acquire start-up equity is important to both entrepreneurs and VCs. For entrepreneurs, the 
valuation they receive at a round of financing determines how much equity is sold for a given 
capital infusion, and may have corporate control implications. Venture capitalists also care about 
price. In a liquidity event, VCs earn the difference between the share price at that time and the 
price they paid to acquire the start-up’s equity. Interestingly, Megginson and Weiss forward the 
notion that entrepreneurs may have to compromise valuation to “pay” for VC certification: “one 
of the services that entrepreneurial firms purchase with VC funding is easier access to capital 
markets and the ability of venture capitalists to reduce asymmetrical information in the offering 
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process” (1991, p. 883; emphasis added). Left unanswered, however, is the purchase price start-
ups pay to access reputable VCs. The next section therefore addresses the question of what 
makes a VC reputable.  
 
B. What Makes VCs Reputable? 
 The business press and descriptive literature have characterized simple monetary capital 
infusion as commodity-like in the early-stage start-up process, and VCs have sought to 
differentiate themselves by the quality of business services and reputational capital they bring to 
their portfolio companies (e.g., New York Times (2000)). Some VCs argue that while start-ups 
might give up a larger equity stake in their company for a given capital infusion by a more 
experienced VC, the entrepreneur’s remaining stake in his company is more valuable ex post as a 
result of the venture capitalist’s value-added services. These services include business referrals, 
extensive mentoring, and financial assistance (MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1989)), which 
may be particularly important for early-stage start-ups (Roberts (1991)). Entrepreneurs seem to 
accept the reasoning that there is value in being associated with experienced and connected VCs: 
 
Venture funding is available from many sources. Entrepreneurs choose a lead venture partner to 
tap into practical experience, contacts, and reputations. “The money is all the same,” says Louis 
Volpe, president of Arrowpoint Communications. “But what type of additional value do you get? 
With Matrix Ventures, you get experienced people and a good network in telecom.” Those 
intangibles can make the difference in landing a key early customer, attracting top caliber 
employees, and lining up the best IPO underwriters. The experience can make a real difference 
driving a brand new company in the right direction fast. (Boston Globe (2000, p. D1).  
 
Therefore, as a venture capitalist gains more investment experience in a particular 
industrial sector, he or she is more likely to acquire the expertise needed to help start-ups in their 
portfolio acquire resources for successful development, which is a powerful contributor to VC 
reputation. Investment experience also accords with Gompers’ (1996) age proxy for VC 
reputation. Each additional investment extends the VC’s information network, either acquiring 
important social contacts and/or gaining experience in effectively structuring deals or monitoring 
entrepreneurs in the industrial sector (Sorenson and Stuart (2001)). For example, Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield & Byers, a prominent venture capital firm, claims to facilitate interorganizational 
cooperation among its network of portfolio companies by “brokering” strategically important 
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information among them. As evidence, the firm claims that there are over 100 strategic alliances 
among its portfolio companies, and the firm’s web site (www.kpcb.com) notes:  
 
We borrow the term “keiretsu” from Japan’s powerful networks of companies. However, unlike 
Japan, Kleiner’s keiretsu is a particularly western, entrepreneurial, loosely coupled web of 
relationships. Kleiner doesn’t control any ventures: they’re each independent, run by strong, 
outstanding entrepreneurs. There’s no central controlling bank, or interlocking board of directors. 
But the executives in the KPCB Keiretsu often share experiences, insight, knowledge and 
information. This network, comprised of more than 175 companies and thousands of executives, 
has proven to be an invaluable tool to entrepreneurs in both emerging and developing companies. 
 
Lindsey (2002) provides empirical support for this VC “keiretsu” phenomenon. Indeed, 
the VC information brokerage role can be particularly important to start-up development since 
these early stage private firms face imperfect markets for information (Aoki (2000)). Thin 
markets for information arise both because start-ups are secretive in order to protect their 
competitive position, and because there may be few alternate channels outside of a trusted third 
party for information dissemination.  
In addition, VCs acting as information brokers may assist a start-up in business 
development in different ways depending on the stage of the enterprise. In the earlier stages, VCs 
may help in recruiting senior executive officers (Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Hellmann and 
Puri (2002)) and in striking strategic alliances (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999)). In the later 
stages of start-up development, VCs may help assemble additional funds and/or achieve 
liquidity. This may be done through hiring talented investment bankers (Barry et al. (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991)) or in locating merger or acquisition partners (Gans, Hsu, and 
Stern (2002)). Because these resources are reinforced by the VC’s investment experience in the 
start-up’s industrial sector, entrepreneurial demand for VC affiliation should be increasing in the 
VC’s industry deal experience. The dual hypotheses to be tested are therefore: (a) Offers made 
by more reputable VCs are more likely to be accepted, and (b) the price that entrepreneurs pay 
in the market for affiliation is inversely associated with VC reputation. 
 
II. Methodology and Data 
A. Methodology 
To test these hypotheses, I use a method drawn from Stern (2000) in collecting data on 
the bundle of offers – both accepted and declined – made to start-ups for financing the first 
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professional round. This methodology, by taking an offer as the unit of analysis, is well suited to 
studying the market for affiliation, because examining multiple price observations associated 
with venture capitalists of varying reputation for a given start-up in effect traces out a demand 
curve for affiliation.3 Start-up firm effects can be held constant in examining valuation 
differences across financing offers, thus mitigating the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Consequently, the empirical focus can shift to examining the role of differences in VC 
characteristics.  
The empirical models estimate two equations using a financing offer from the multiple- 
offers dataset as the unit of analysis. The likelihood that an offer is accepted is modeled as: 
Pr (Offer accepted = 1) = F (VC Reputation, Valuation, Controls).   (1) 
This offer acceptance equation is estimated using fixed effects logit models. The valuation 
equation is modeled as follows, and is estimated using fixed effects OLS regressions:  
Valuation = F (VC Reputation, Controls).       (2) 
In implementing this method, it is important to study early-stage financing rounds. Early-
stage investors can weigh heavily in shaping the identity of subsequent investors (often through 
referrals or by virtue of their reputation). As well, earlier rounds of financing are usually 
associated with more technical and demand uncertainty. As a result, conventional valuation 
methods are difficult to apply to young firms with intangible assets, and so valuations of early-
stage start-ups are subject to a great deal of negotiation (rather than straightforward calculation). 
The resulting heterogeneity in prices for association with disparate VCs (which themselves vary 
in reputation) is an important feature of early-stage funding rounds that help identify the market 
for affiliation.  
This section describes both the details of the data collection process and the data used to 
test the key hypothesis. Before doing so, however, it is useful to address two issues: (1) Potential 
biases resulting from a simple cross-sectional analysis, and (2) data collection challenges 
associated with employing the proposed methodology. Regarding the first issue, unobserved or 
mismeasured start-up qualities correlated with the price VCs pay for equity, such as differences 
in the demand for affiliation with reputable VCs, may bias cross-sectional estimates. 
                                                          
3 To my knowledge, the incidence of start-ups receiving multiple financing offers has been investigated only by 
Smith (1999) who reports that 71% of the responding companies in his survey received more than one financing 
offer. While the rate of multiple offers is interesting in its own right, the current study instead uses multiple 
financing offer events to identify the market for affiliation. 
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Furthermore, there may be unobserved selection processes matching start-ups with VCs. Without 
detailed controls for such processes, cross-sectional estimates may be biased in a way sensitive 
to the sampling scheme.  
To collect data on a start-up’s financing offers is a challenge in itself, since early-stage 
entrepreneurs are typically (and rightfully) reluctant to disclose information that might 
compromise their strategic position (Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Hellmann and Puri (2000)). 
In addition, VC market consulting companies do not collect data on the bundle of financing 
offers received by start-ups. Consequently, obtaining the set of declined financing offers (rather 
than assembling a matched comparable, for example) requires asking entrepreneurs themselves 
for the sensitive information. I do so through a survey instrument. While designing and 
administering the survey was a labor-intensive process, few substitutes exist to gather detailed 
information about (1) the founding and organization of the start-up, (2) the VCs offering to 
invest in the start-up, and (3) the prices that were offered. A brief section describing institutional 
details about the sampled start-ups precedes a discussion about the data.  
 
A.1. The MIT E-Lab Program 
The MIT Entrepreneurship Program offers a semester-long class, “Entrepreneurship 
Laboratory” (“E-Lab”), which assembles teams of MIT and Harvard graduate students to study 
specific business-related issues at actual start-ups. In exchange for a complimentary business 
development analysis done by graduate students, the E-Lab firms’ senior executive officers 
commit to allocating a certain amount of time and effort to interacting with the students. E-Lab 
began in 1995 and approximately 300 start-up companies had applied to participate in the 
program by the summer of 2000. Far more companies apply for the program, however, than the 
supply of student teams can accommodate.  
In order to qualify for E-Lab, the start-up has to meet two criteria: (1) Its headcount must 
be less than approximately 35 at the time of entering the program, and (2) it must have 
completed a Series A round of investment. This group of start-ups is an attractive one to survey 
for two reasons. First, the sample includes funded, early-stage start-ups that were not selected for 
any qualities related to the price that VCs paid for their equity. Second, because of the MIT 





The empirical approach requires measures of VC reputation from firms offering to invest 
in the sample of E-Lab firms, as well as information about the offers themselves. The survey 
instrument (see the appendix) collects this information using a variety of measures, such as the 
entrepreneur’s perceived reputation ranking of investors from which it received a financing offer. 
More objective data about the VC’s reputation (e.g., investment experience in each high-tech 
industrial segment) were collected from the Venture Economics database through Securities Data 
Corporation/Thomson Financial.  
 
B.1. The Financing New High-Tech Ventures Survey 
After pre-testing the survey with entrepreneurs (both those contemporaneously 
undergoing the Series A financing process and those who had already gone through it), VCs, 
academics, and intellectual property attorneys, I mailed the survey to the population of 
approximately 300 E-Lab companies. I then placed telephone calls to follow up with informants. 
The data were collected over the phone over five months starting July 15, 2000. Respondents to 
the survey were typically a founder and/or a person who knew the details of a firm’s start-up and 
financing history (frequently this was one of the following senior executive officers: a CEO, 
CTO, and/or CFO). 
Nearly half of the companies in the E-Lab population responded to the survey. Non-
respondents seemed randomly mixed between those without time to participate in the survey and 
those (to a lesser extent) unwilling to participate in the study. Formal tests of differences between 
observables on the two samples are difficult, however, due to the data constraints on the firms 
not in the sample. Indeed, many of the firms in the E-Lab population were not yet listed in 
venture capital industry consulting firm databases. 
The survey responses yielded a total of 246 offers to 149 start-ups. While 98 of these 
start-ups received a single financing offer, 51 of them received more than one offer for financing 
their first professional round. The average start-up receiving multiple offers averaged almost 
three offers each, resulting in 148 offers made to this set of companies.  
As an overview of the entire sample, Table I (Panels A and B) reports the age distribution 
of start-ups in the sample, together with the distribution of offers received by the sample of E-
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Lab start-ups. The empirical puzzle in these data is that only 43% of the start-ups among those 
receiving multiple offers accepted their best financial offer. Moreover, the start-ups not accepting 
their most generous financial offer left a considerable amount of value “on the table,” amounting 
to $173.9M in aggregate pre-money valuation. This was calculated as the sum of the differences 
between their best financial offer and the accepted offer. For the group of multiple offer firms 
declining their best financial offer, the foregone pre-money value as a fraction of the accepted 
offer ranged from a low of 3.6% to a high of 217%, with an average of 33.2% for the sample. 
This descriptive interpretation of the data, of course, would be different if the overall sample of 
single and multiple offers were considered, as shown in Table I.  
[Insert TABLE I around here] 
Panel B of Table I also describes the means of a wide range of start-up characteristics, 
broken out by the number of offers received. These characteristics include start-up founding 
year; Series A financing year; number of employees prior to Series A funding; revenues from 
first year operations; patent applications and grants; industrial representation; and geographic 
location. The average start-up was founded in the first half of 1997 and received its Series A 
funding just 14 months later (over 80% of the start-ups in the dataset received Series A funding 
between 1998 and 2000). Prior to receiving this funding round, the average start-up in the sample 
employed 10 people and had about $0.27M in revenues from first-year operations. As well, by 
the end of 2000, the typical start-up had applied for 5.4 patents and had received 1.2 patent 
grants. A high proportion of the start-ups, 74%, were located in Massachusetts, which may not 
be surprising given the nature of the E-Lab program (by comparison, 53% of the accepted VC 
offers were from Massachusetts-based VC firms). Additionally, 13% of the start-ups in the 
sample were located in California (15% of the accepted VC offers were from California-based 
VC firms). 
The industrial representation of the E-Lab start-ups in the sample is fairly typical of the 
broader set of industries funded by venture capitalists over the same time period (the average E-
Lab firm in the sample received Series A funding in the middle of 1998). Of the sampled 
companies, 26% are in Internet services, 17% are in Internet infrastructure, and 5% are in 
Internet retailing. The software sector comprises about 16% of the sample, while computer 
hardware represents 6% of the sample. Communications and health sciences (biotechnology and 
medical devices) each comprise 10% of the sample, respectively. This distribution of firms 
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seems to mirror the overall financing trends by VCs from 1997 to 2000. For example, according 
to Venture Economics, in 1999, 43% of VC disbursements went to Internet-based start-ups, and 
57% of VC funds in the first three quarters of 2000 were invested in that sector. 
While Panel B of Table I presents the conditional means of the observable start-up 
characteristics by the number of offers received, it is difficult to tell whether statistical 
differences exist. Panel C therefore compares sampled start-ups receiving single offers with 
those receiving multiple offers via t-tests of equality of means. The results reveal that the start-
ups’ qualities between the single versus multiple-offers subsamples were statistically the same 
between the groups.  
Panel D presents similar tests for the subsamples of VC characteristics. While these 
figures reflect accepted offers and are likely the result of a bargaining process between 
entrepreneurs and VCs, it is likely that the multiple-offers subsample contains the better deals 
(with higher pre-money valuations, more funding offered, and greater interest from more 
experienced VCs).  
In order to use the start-up fixed effects methodology previously described, only the set 
of firms receiving multiple financing offers is analyzed in the remaining empirical tables. While 
selection issues as a result of this empirical strategy may be of concern, the finding that start-up 
characteristics are statistically the same across recipients of single- and multiple-financing offers 
is reassuring. As well, tests of result robustness using Heckman’s (1979) selection-adjusted 
estimators employing the full dataset are presented at the conclusion of the empirical analysis. 
While there are some potential costs to relying on the multiple-offers subsample (selection 
issues), the benefits are in identifying the affiliation effect, a result that will become clear by 
comparing the results using the multiple offers methodology (Tables IV through VIII) with 
“cross-sectional” results based on realized financing outcomes of the entire E-Lab sample (Table 
IX). In addition, because the multiple-offers subsample likely contains better deals, this bias may 
actually make it more difficult to find an affiliation effect, since the most promising ventures 
would potentially have the least to gain from VC affiliation. 
 
B.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
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Table II reports variable definitions and summary statistics for the multiple-offers sample 
in which the unit of analysis is an offer to a start-up, while Table III contains the correlation 
matrix for these variables.  
[Insert TABLE II and TABLE III around here] 
Two measures of price are used in the empirical analysis. Pre-money valuation, the 
product of the number of shares outstanding before the Series A financing round and the offered 
per-unit share price (mean = $20.6M), has become a standard measure in the literature (Gompers 
and Lerner (2000)). Relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up 
relative to the highest offered valuation received by that start-up (mean = 0.83). Note that 
because many of these financing rounds took place during the late 1990s, the inflated valuations 
characterizing the “Internet bubble” are likely reflected here. Two additional factors may also be 
reflected in these valuations: (1) Several of the companies had prior informal funding rounds–
such as “angel” and/or “friends and family” rounds before their first professional round, and (2) 
financing offers given to start-ups with multiple offers averaged $8.9M more in pre-money 
valuation relative to their single-offer counterparts, a statistically significant difference. In any 
case, instead of focusing on the magnitude of valuation offered, the primary concern here is to 
explain variance across financing offers for a given start-up. Given these circumstances, relative 
valuation offered is the preferred measure of price throughout the empirical analysis (though pre-
money valuation and relative valuation offered are positively correlated at 0.40). 
The key independent variables are correlates of VC reputation.4 In accord with the 
concept of VC reputation as expected quality based on previous experience, several “objective” 
measures are employed, based on data as of December 31, 2000 from the Venture Economics 
database. They include high industry deal experience, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number 
of investments the VC has made in the start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the 
sample median (mean = 0.44). This is the main measure of reputation used in the empirical 
tables, and is consistent with the concept that VC “domain expertise” is an important input to 
both VC reputation and VCs’ ability to add value to their portfolio companies.  
                                                          
4 If a start-up’s Series A round was syndicated, I used information from the lead VC, as prior research suggests that 
lead investors devote more direct resources to assisting their portfolio companies relative to syndication partners 
(Gorman and Sahlman (1989)). A syndicated offer is counted as a single offer in this study. Syndicates are common 
among the accepted offers (65%), a fact that is not surprising given the early stage financing rounds examined. 
Unfortunately, my survey did not capture the full syndicate for offers that were not accepted, and so I am not able to 
test whether syndication has an effect on the likelihood of offer acceptance and on valuation. 
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Two measures proxy for services and resources that VCs provide for start-ups. The 
measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the 
maximum Likert-scale measure (of five) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC 
network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, and contacts 
with investment banks (mean = 0.43). A second (alternative) measure of resource transfer is a 
proxy for the available time a general partner has to potentially devote to start-up development, 
boards per general partner (mean = 4.2). This measure divides the number of boards of directors 
on which a VC firm participates by the number of general partners in the VC firm. While the 
pair-wise correlation between high network resources rating and boards per general partner is 
not particularly high (0.05), it is interesting to note that there is some degree of correlation 
between boards per general partner and high industry deal experience (0.46). These correlations 
may be due to a countervailing boards per general partner effect: A high ratio may proxy for 
network connections that may be valuable for start-up development.  
Finally, two additional measures of reputation are used as robustness checks in the 
analysis. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy equal to 1 if the number of prior 
funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per year(s) of operation places the VC above 
the sample median. This variable (mean = 0.57) is a measure of VC success in raising additional 
financial capital from limited partners, a requirement for survival in the VC industry.5 While the 
internal rate of return (IRR) of past VC funds would be a nice measure of reputation, IRRs are 
usually held confidential by VC firms (Gompers and Lerner (1999)). Industry reputation rank 
(mean = 5.9) is an ordered ranking, 7 being first best and 1 being worst, of VC reputation among 
offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur in the survey instrument (the measure has been 
reversed from the original survey-based measure for expositional ease). Because this variable is 
based on entrepreneurial perception and measures relative exclusiveness, industry reputation 
rank incorporates the notion that the value of affiliation may depend on the VC’s hierarchical 
position (Frank (1985) and Podolny (1993)). The subjective nature of this measure warrants 
                                                          
5 A priori we would expect that high industry deal experience and high normalized funds raised would be positively 
correlated. The -0.21 pair-wise correlation may result because the two measures are derived indicator variables for 
the top half of the deal experience and prior funds raised distributions. Reassuringly, the pair-wise correlation 
between the number of prior VC deals in the industry sector and prior funds raised is positively correlated at 0.56. 
As well, the unconditioned pair-wise correlations between high industry deal experience and high normalized funds 
raised do not reflect control for any other VC or start-up characteristics. 
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discussion of its use, however (see below); consequently this measure will be used only for 
robustness checks in the empirical analysis.  
A group of controls for other VC characteristics is used throughout the empirical 
analysis. The variable corporate VC is a dummy variable (mean = 0.11) for whether the VC is a 
corporate investor, since evidence and theory suggest that this method of organizing 
entrepreneurial finance has different organizational and incentive implications relative to 
independent venture capitalists (Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Hellmann (2002)). The variable 
angel investor is a dummy equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel or angel group (mean = 
0.07). The variable equity taken threshold is a dummy equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 
30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) (mean = 0.52). While equity taken threshold 
may be endogenous to price, this variable may be an indicator of corporate control implications 
of an offer, and is therefore included as a control variable. The variable financing offered is the 
amount of capital offered by the investor in the Series A financing round (mean = $7.86M). The 
previous two measures are meant to proxy for the fact that entrepreneurs may prefer offers that 
allow them to retain a higher stake of equity in their company. As well, larger financing offers 
may delay the need to return to venture capitalists for additional funding, providing a liquidity 
benefit to the new venture.  
 
III. Empirical Results 
The empirical assignment is straightforward—to test the hypotheses that (a) financing 
offers from more reputable VCs are more likely to be accepted, and (b) more reputable VCs 
acquire start-up equity at a discount. This section is therefore organized around empirical tables 
that demonstrate these relationships in both univariate and multivariate settings.  
Table IV shows simple univariate comparisons of conditional means without controlling 
for fixed firm effects. Panel A describes difference in means tests for accepted versus declined 
financing offers. While the average pre-money value of accepted offers is $17.7M, the declined 
offers averaged $22.1M (the difference is not statistically significant, however). Accepted offers 
had higher values of VC reputation relative to non-accepted offers, as measured four ways. The 
measures normalized industry deal experience (industry deal experience per year(s) of 
operation), normalized funds raised (number of funds raised per year(s) of operation), industry 
reputation rank, and high network resources rating all have higher values for accepted offers 
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relative to declined ones. The differences in means for the latter three variables are statistically 
significant. Panel B describes the conditional means of relative valuation offered for the upper 
and lower halves (divided at the median) of normalized industry deal experience, normalized 
funds raised, industry reputation rank, and high network resources rating. Examining the 
conditional means of relative valuation offered rather than pre-money valuation in this context is 
preferred because the former measure incorporates some information about the comparative 
nature of the offers. The latter measure does not group offers by start-up firms in any way. While 
the differences in conditional means for the four reputation measures are not statistically 
significant, each of the relative means is consistent with the argument that more reputable VCs 
offer a discount to Series A valuation. Specifically, higher measures of VC reputation are 
associated with lower valuation offers. These univariate tests, while suggestive, do not control 
for qualities of the start-up, and so the remaining tables present a more systematic, multivariate 
analysis. 
[Insert TABLE IV around here] 
Table V examines start-up fixed effects logits of VC offer accepted using Chamberlain’s 
(1980) conditional likelihood method. Specification (5-1) shows that in the bivariate case, high 
industry deal experience is positively associated with VC offer accepted, at a statistically 
significant level (5%) and implies a 2.94-fold change in the odds of offer acceptance for a 
discrete change in this measure of VC reputation. While a more systematic exploration of the 
robustness of the VC reputation result is found in Table VII, a similar result holds in the bivariate 
relationship between VC offer accepted and high normalized funds raised. The reputation result 
is strengthened when a measure of valuation, relative valuation offered, is included in 
specification (5-2). Notice the relative importance of the reputation effect over the valuation 
effect on the likelihood that an offer is accepted. Specification (5-3) includes an additional 
measure of VC reputation, high network resources rating, and controls for a variety of VC- and 
terms-of-financing-effects: Angel investor, corporate venture capital, financing offered, and 
equity taken threshold. The high network resources rating measure is meant to capture VC 
value-added effects through contacts and/or resources that could make an offer more attractive 
(and can contribute to VC reputation). The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The measure angel investor is meant to capture the fact 
that a knowledgeable angel investor could be a substitute for a reputable VC in providing 
  18
certification and business development resources, while the corporate VC method of organizing 
entrepreneurial finance may have implications for the value they can add to portfolio firms 
(Gompers and Lerner (1999)). Higher levels of financing offered may be a VC offer feature that 
may make it more attractive, since entrepreneurs may not have to return as many times or as 
soon for further financing rounds (fund-raising is an activity that may be quite time-consuming 
for start-up executives). Finally, the reputation result is not sensitive to the choice of a wide 
range of equity taken threshold levels between 20 and 50% of equity taken in the financing round 
(unreported regressions).  
[Insert TABLE V around here] 
Notice that start-up characteristics are not included in these specifications. Since start-up 
characteristics (such as industry representation) are invariant across offers for a given start-up, 
including these qualities in the regressions does not affect the results. In addition, because 
financing offers for a given start-up did not span a large time window, variables on financing 
timing were not included in the regressions. In the pre-test of the survey, I asked respondents 
about the time window issue. It was my sense based on these interviews that the time window 
was not open for a long duration, given the start-up financing conditions of the late 1990s. 
Unfortunately, in the survey, I only noted the date of the realized Series A funding round, so I 
am unable to empirically document the time window length. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, 
the main result from Table V is that start-ups in this sample may not be selecting investors 
primarily on the basis of price and valuation; instead, VC reputation and affiliation effects may 
indeed be more important.  
Table VI presents relative valuation offered start-up fixed effects OLS regressions. The 
reported standard errors are robust – having been adjusted for clustering by start-up firm. The 
pairwise specification with high industry deal experience in (6-1) shows a negative relationship 
that is statistically significant at the 5% level. As well, the estimated coefficient implies a 
substantial discount, 14%, on relative valuation offered for a discrete change in the measure of 
VC reputation. 
[Insert TABLE VI around here] 
In (6-2), together with the measure of VC reputation, a dummy variable for VC offer 
accepted is included as a regressor. Notice that this parameter estimate, while positive (in both 6-
2) and (6-3)), does not achieve statistical significance and is small in magnitude. The reputation 
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effect persists and is of a slightly larger estimated magnitude relative to the previous 
specification. In model (6-3), several additional variables (parallel to those used in the prior 
table) are introduced. While the economic significance of the reputation result is slightly 
diminished in this specification, the parameter is estimated more precisely, achieving statistical 
significance at the 1% level. While the high network resources rating estimate is not statistically 
significant, it is estimated with a negative coefficient, which is consistent with the main 
hypothesis tested. The estimated coefficient on equity taken threshold is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that larger equity stakes are associated with price discounts, though 
as previously mentioned, endogeneity concerns moderate the interpretation of this control 
variable. As well, the logarithm of financing offered is estimated with a positive, significant 
coefficient, indicating that the magnitude of funding, including potential liquidity effects, is 
associated with higher valuation. While robustness checks of the valuation regressions are 
presented in Table VIII, the results presented in Table VI are consistent with the idea that start-
up entrepreneurs pay a premium to accept financing from more reputable venture capitalists. 
Because the above-reported results may be an artifact of either the particular measures 
used or due to selection biases arising from examining the multiple-offers dataset, Tables VII 
and VIII present robustness checks of the reputation results for the offer acceptance and 
valuation regressions, respectively. The first three columns of Table VII successively employ 
alternate measures of VC reputation in fixed effects logits to study the robustness of the positive 
correlation between VC offer accepted and reputation in similar specifications to (5-3). 
Specification (7-1) substitutes high normalized funds raised for high industry deal experience as 
one of the measures of reputation. While the statistical significance falls to the 10% level, a 
discrete change in the funds raised measure corresponds to a doubling of the odds that an offer is 
accepted. Relative to specification (5-3), the estimated coefficient of high network resource 
rating is very similar in (7-1), both in magnitude and in statistical significance. In (7-2), industry 
reputation rank substitutes for high industry deal experience as an alternative measure of VC 
reputation. In this specification, both industry reputation rank and high network resources rating 
are positive and significant at the 1% level, though the estimated coefficient on relative valuation 
offered is much larger in comparative magnitude than the reputation measures. In (7-3), boards 
per general partner is used as an alternative measure of VC resources and is meant to capture the 
available time that partners in VC firms might have available in mentoring, developing, and 
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connecting start-ups. While that variable is estimated with a nearly zero effect, the other 
reputation measure used in this specification, high industry deal experience, is estimated with 
quantitatively similar results (statistically and economically) to those found in Table V. Varying 
the measure of valuation as a control variable from relative valuation offered to the log of pre-
money valuation causes high industry deal experience to fall to the 6% level, but does not alter 
the economic significance of the estimate (unreported specification).  
[Insert TABLE VII around here] 
Thus far, the analysis has not taken into account the possibility of a selection bias as a 
result of only using the multiple offers data, though descriptive data from Table I suggest no 
statistical differences in the key observable start-up characteristics in the subsamples of the data 
corresponding to single versus multiple offers. Had we observed the alternate option for 
entrepreneurs that factually received single offers, would the results persist? Because 
establishing that counterfactual is difficult, two-stage Heckman (1979) regressions are presented 
where in the first stage, a probit of the likelihood of multiple offers is estimated using qualities of 
the start-up. These estimates are used in a second-stage fixed-effects regression of VC offer 
accepted (in Table VII) and relative valuation offered (in Table VIII) as an adjustment for 
possible selection effects.  
The first-stage regression in Tables VII and VIII includes start-up covariates of the 
likelihood of receiving multiple offers: The natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of 
start-up employees, L initial employees; a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have 
assigned patents, zero patents; dummy variables for the following industry sectors: Internet 
industry (including infrastructure, services, and retail subsegments); health science industry 
(biotechnology and medical devices); computer industry (software and hardware);  and year of 
Series A financing dummies for Year 1998, Year 1999, and Year 2000.6 Second-stage fixed-
effects Heckman linear probability estimates of VC offer accepted are reported in the final two 
                                                          
6 The omitted category for the industry variables is the communications industry. The results of the selection 
equation are found at the bottom of Tables VII and VIII. Note that the selection equation includes variables (start-up 
characteristics) that are likely to act as good instruments because these characteristics are not relevant in the second-
stage analysis (they are absorbed by the start-up fixed effects). 
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columns of Table VII.7 While the bivariate specification including high industry deal experience 
(7-4) is estimated more precisely (significant at the 1% level) relative to its counterpart in (5-1), 
the economic magnitude of the estimate is diminished. Meanwhile, the fully specified model (7-
5) yields estimates of similar statistical significance to its counterpart in (5-3), though again with 
diminished economic significance levels.  
Table VIII explores the robustness of the valuation results. A parallel specification 
structure to that used in the previous robustness table is employed. Specification (8-1) substitutes 
high normalized funds raised as one of the measures of VC reputation. While the high 
normalized VC funds raised variable is estimated with a positive (though insignificant) 
coefficient, recall that univariate comparisons in Table IV indicate that high normalized VC 
funds raised was negatively correlated with relative valuation offered (although the difference 
was not statistically significant). In the multivariate regression, the prior funds variable may be 
picking up some countervailing effects, such that VCs with more prior funds raised are able to 
raise subsequent funds of larger sizes.8 The resulting relaxation in VC liquidity may have a 
confounding effect on this proxy for VC reputation. 
[Insert TABLE VIII around here] 
Specification (8-2) utilizes an alternate measure of VC reputation, industry reputation 
rank. The variable estimate is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, an 
objection to using this measure of reputation is that it is subject to entrepreneurial recall bias 
and/or ex-post rationalization by the survey respondent. As an imperfect control for these 
potential effects, a dummy variable for VC offer accepted is included in the specification, 
because the accepted offer is likely to be the chief candidate for recall and retrospection biases. 
Although the reputation measure is statistically significant at conventional levels, we should 
interpret the result cautiously because of the limitations of this measure.  
In both specifications (8-1) and (8-2), high network resources rating, a measure of VC 
services to and resources for the start-up (and an important contributor to VC reputation), is 
estimated with a negative (though insignificant) coefficient, a finding consistent with the results 
                                                          
7 Testing the robustness of VC offer accepted in the context of fixed effects Heckman selection models presents an 
econometric challenge—known as the incidental parameters problem (Heckman (1981) and Hsiao (1986))—in that 
there are no consistent estimators for fixed-effects probits. Therefore, fixed-effect Heckman regressions using a 
second-stage linear probability model are reported. The results are robust to this estimation strategy, though the 
linear probability model is biased when predicted values fall outside of the (0, 1) range. 
8 Indeed, the measure does not take into account variation in achieved VC fund size across the sample (e.g., a prior 
fund of $750M is treated the same as a $30M fund in the count of prior funds raised). 
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from Table VI.9 Specification (8-3) varies this measure of VC resources to boards per general 
partner, and while the measure reaches statistical significance at the 10% level, the economic 
effect is insignificant. Importantly, note that the high industry deal experience proxy for VC 
reputation is robust (though reduced in statistical significance due to some degree of collinearity 
with boards per general partner). In an unreported regression, the log of pre-money valuation 
was used as an alternate measure of valuation. The estimates of high industry deal experience 
were robust to this variation. As well, introducing specifications with dummy variables for the 
most frequently appearing VC firms in the sample did not alter the main results (unreported 
regressions). These indicator variables may be appropriate if we believe that the pricing behavior 
of a handful of VCs is driving the results (over 100 distinct VC firms are represented in the 
sample, however).  
Finally, in (8-4) and (8-5), fixed-effects Heckman regressions are reported using the 
entire sample of single and multiple offers in an effort to address potential selection issues. In 
both the bivariate and the fully specified equations, the results are very similar to those reported 
in Table VI—while the economic significance of the results is unchanged, the precision of the 
estimates is slightly enhanced.10  
A final robustness check suggested that the hypothesized affiliation effects can be found 
using within-industry variation, though these results are not formally reported because they are 
merely suggestive. With the caveat that the categories of “Internet” (that includes Internet 
infrastructure, Internet services, and Internet retailing) and “non-Internet” (that includes 
biotechnology, medical devices, communications, and computer software and hardware) are very 
coarse groupings, the measures of VC reputation (high industry deal experience and high 
network resources rating) are positively associated with VC offer acceptance and negatively 
associated with relative valuation offered, although these relationships tend to hold more 
                                                          
9 As well, potential effects of geographic co-location between VC and start-up in facilitating resource exchange were 
explored. Tests were conducted to examine (a) whether geographic co-location of VC and start-up mattered for offer 
acceptance or for valuation, and (b) whether VCs located in California or Massachusetts were advantaged in offer 
acceptance or equity pricing. In both cases, there were no notable results. This may not be the ideal dataset to test 
such geographic effects, however (most of the start-ups in the dataset are based in Massachusetts). 
10 Estimates of lambda (the inverse of Mill’s ratio) and rho (the correlation between error terms in the first and 
second stage equations) in the Heckman models suggest that selection problems are not severe, and so these 
selection regressions are not reported for all specifications in the paper. 
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strongly for the non-Internet subsample and less so for the Internet subsample.11 These results 
are based on parsimonious specifications (keeping the limited sample size issue in mind); 
however, due to the nature of the dataset, no conclusions about whether these results are due to 
time period effects can be made.  
To conclude the empirical analysis, it is interesting to compare these results to a simple 
cross-sectional OLS analysis of the natural log of pre-money valuation on all accepted offers, 
done as if information on the bundle of declined offers were not available. The results, presented 
in Table IX, are striking.  
[Insert TABLE IX around here] 
In (9-1), a bivariate regression, high industry deal experience, is estimated with a positive 
coefficient, which is significant at the 1% level. When several start-up qualities are included in 
specification (9-2), the VC reputation result persists, disappearing in statistical significance only 
with the inclusion of VC characteristics (9-3), though the reputation measure is still estimated 
with a positive coefficient in that specification. As previously mentioned, problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity likely bias these estimates.  
 
IV. Conclusion and Discussion 
I have tested and confirmed the proposition that entrepreneurs are willing to accept a 
discount on the valuation of their start-up in order to access the capital of venture capitalists with 
better reputations. These results help deepen our understanding of the market for affiliation by 
presenting empirical evidence that affiliation is an ordinary economic good for which actors 
seeking association will face a price-reputation trade off. This finding is consistent with the view 
that venture capitalists’ reputation (which in turn depends on their experience, information 
network, and direct assistance to the portfolio firms) may be more distinctive than their 
functionally equivalent financial capital. These conclusions are drawn from an analysis of 
multiple offers to a set of start-ups, which allows a high degree of statistical control. Because the 
                                                          
11 Because of the contemporaneous emergence of the Internet industry, high industry deal experience may not be a 
good measure in this empirical setting (I thank the referee for pointing this out). While there is variation in this 
measure within the subsamples, it is doubtful that high industry deal experience is an adequate proxy for VC 
knowledge and experience helpful for start-up development in the Internet industries. Using the industry reputation 
rank proxy for reputation yields strong results, though the problems with this measure are discussed elsewhere in the 
paper. Using high normalized funds raised yields similar results for the VC offer accepted regressions but rather 
weak results for the valuation regressions. 
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characteristics of the start-up can be held constant, only differences in VC reputation across 
financing offers explain inter-offer variation in offer acceptance and price for start-up equity.  
One may wonder why prices charged by competing VCs to acquire the equity in a given 
start-up can be differentiated in equilibrium, given free entry. VCs with higher reputations may 
be able to sustain their higher prices (rather than having competition equilibrate prices) as a 
result of investments in reputation being costly (Shapiro (1983) and Megginson and Weiss 
(1991)). Consequently, while financial capital per se is not a differentiated good, the reputation 
of venture capitalists providing the financial capital can be a source of differentiation among VC 
organizations. The findings in this article are consistent with Kaplan and Schoar’s (2003) recent 
evidence of substantial cross-sectional variation and persistence in VC fund performance. 
Several alternate explanations to the empirical pattern have been considered throughout 
the empirical analysis. First, more savvy VC firms might have foreseen the coming public 
market downturn and offered lower prices as a result. However, entrepreneurs receiving multiple 
offers would not necessarily have to accept offers from such VC firms, and so this explanation 
does not seem consistent with the observed empirical pattern. A second alternative hypothesis is 
that the term sheet covenants across offers for a given start-up may have differed. Indeed, the 
price VCs offer for equity may not be the only factor that matters when entrepreneurs select a 
VC firm, and other dimensions of the term sheet may not be “priced in” to the offered valuations. 
While surveyed entrepreneurs were asked for a copy of their term sheet offers, very few 
complied with this request. However, Suchman (1995) provides some evidence of convergence 
in VC financing agreements over time as a result of using the same law firms. As well, while 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that covenants in VC contracts differ by stage of start-up 
development, the offered terms of financing for a given start-up across VC firms may not be as 
variable. Nevertheless, different VCs probably prefer different terms, and offered terms are 
likely to vary even for a given start-up in a particular time period. As a result, comparing offers 
primarily on the basis of price is an inherent limitation of the present study.  
Several additional issues associated with the data used for this study result in 
interpretational concerns. First, are the findings simply an artifact of the sample used? Although 
this group of companies might be of higher quality relative to average start-ups (assuming that 
the decision to be involved with MIT is a signal of quality), the sample, while modest at 148 
offers, may represent a conservative test of the hypothesized effect. High quality entrepreneurs 
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have their own reputations and established networks, which would tend to obviate the need to 
pay a premium to access capital from more experienced funding sources. In any case, employing 
start-up fixed effects makes this quality issue less important for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis. Indeed, the unique timing of the study in an environment in which many VCs were 
“chasing after deals” allowed identification of the market for affiliation—though it does not 
necessarily address the applicability of these results to other time periods or other relationships. 
It is difficult, unfortunately, to speculate on that answer.  
A second issue is whether the results are produced from the competitive effect associated 
with studying a sample of multiple offers. This proposition is also hard to evaluate, however, due 
to the difficulty of establishing a counterfactual to single-offer situations. On a related note, a 
deeper understanding of the process leading to multiple offers would be desirable. The manifold 
processes generating offers (some of which are unobserved, such as entrepreneurial charisma), as 
well as the disparate bargaining processes leading to offers, makes the fixed-effects methodology 
attractive in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, had I collected information 
about the sequencing of offers, I might have been able to gain some empirical insight into the 
process generating multiple offers. Sequencing data may have also helped in beginning to 
empirically disentangle the pure affiliation effect from the VC value-added effect.  
Two issues related to offers and how they might affect the interpretation of the results are 
also worth discussing. First, what if entrepreneurs “shopped” their deal to other VCs without 
receiving a formal term sheet? Unfortunately, I do not have the history of how many pitches 
entrepreneurs made to different VC groups without receiving formal offers. The results may be 
biased if (a) informal offers were leveraged to negotiate more favorable formal offers, and (b) 
VCs with a less established reputation were more willing to revise their valuations upward 
relative to VCs with more established reputations. Unfortunately, data constraints prohibit this 
analysis; however, survey respondents were instructed to provide information on final formal 
term sheets only (including informal offers would have subjected the sample to entrepreneurial 
interpretation of what constituted an informal offer). A second issue is whether some of the high 
valuation offers were withdrawn by VCs as the negotiations became more serious. Again, 
systematic data are unfortunately unavailable to address this question. If withdrawals came from 
across the full distribution of VCs, this would not bias the results. If, on the other hand, 
withdrawals were systematically from less-reputable VCs, the study would be biased toward 
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finding the results (and the opposite would be true if reputable VCs tended to withdraw offers). 
Given the market environment (“money chasing deals”) in which these data were collected in the 
second half of 2000 and my conversations with survey respondents, however, I believe that offer 
withdrawal was not a pervasive phenomenon in this sample. However, because I cannot rule out 
these two issues, they represent caveats to the study. 
A final issue is interpreting what start-ups are buying. For example, industry deal 
experience in the start-up’s sector can proxy for both the scope of the VC’s information network 
as well as the VC’s ability to evaluate deals. Unfortunately, the data in this study do not provide 
a clean way of disentangling these effects. As well, higher ability entrepreneurs may be taking a 
lower offer in an effort to signal quality (Spence (1974)). While the empirical setting and the 
documented empirical patterns make this explanation unlikely, the proposition cannot be ruled 
out.  
Looking to the future, while this study does not test the ex-post performance implications 
of selecting a particular VC, it would be interesting to do so. For example, did start-ups 
accepting funding from more reputable VCs receive higher step-ups in valuation in subsequent 
rounds? Did they achieve an IPO faster or deliver products to the market more quickly?12 
Nevertheless, the findings in this study are consistent with the theory that entrepreneurs who are 
tied into more connected networks at reputable VC firms expect to come across more 
opportunities for start-up growth, but must pay a premium for such access.  
                                                          
12 As a preliminary analysis, I examined as of January 31, 2002 whether accepting funding from a more reputable 
VC was correlated with surviving in the post-bubble shakeout period. While there are issues about the appropriate 
lag time to examine such an effect, a substantial fraction of the firms in the sample are either still operating, or were 
acquired for an undisclosed amount, rendering an assessment of “success” difficult. For these reasons, these 
preliminary analyses were not illuminating. 
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APPENDIX: 
MIT Sloan Financing New  
High-Tech Ventures Survey 
 
Name of Firm: ________________________________________________________________ 
Location (city, state): ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Part I: Background Information 
 
A. Founding the Company 
When was your company founded (month, year)? __________________________ 
When was your company incorporated (month, year)? _______________________ 
Name of Founder Current job 
title 
Company Reason for leaving 
(if applicable) 
# of prior 
start-ups 
founded 

















     
 
If the founding team previously started other companies, which category best describes the average 
approximate internal rate of return(s) on Series A investment for those previous venture(s)?  
< 0   0-10%  11-50%   51-100%  101-500% >500%  
How many of those founded firm(s) were taken public? __________________ 
At the time of start-up, what did your founding team consider to be the company’s key competitive 
advantage? (select the most important two)  
Establishing a new market    Establishing a new technology  Recruiting superior personnel          
Establishing an advantageous cost position              Superior positioning in the product niche                      
Maintaining superior intellectual property   Superior customer service & responsiveness
 Superior product quality / reliability   Other: ________________________________ 
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B. Employee Information  
Number of Employees: at the time of raising Series A financing: ______  as of 7/1/00: ______  
  
Current number of employees in each of the following functions: 
 R&D  Sales  Marketing Manufacturing General & Service  
       or Operations  Admin. 
 ____  ____   ____  ____   ____  ____ 
 
Please indicate which of the senior executive officers below was on the founding team. If not on the 
founding team, please designate from what source the executive officer came. Please “x” out the position 
if it does not exist in your company, and draw lines connecting positions, if one person holds multiple 
positions. 
   
   CEO COO CFO CTO     VP,  VP,     VP,    Other:  
       Marketing        Sales Bus. Dev.    ________ 
On founding team 









C. Financing the Company 
Did you have a completed business plan before getting your Series A funding?   Yes    No 
 
Time from completing the business plan to receiving your first financing offer: ____ months 
 
Who were the participants in your company’s financing(s) to date? If a number of “angel investors” 
participated, please group them all as “Angels” in the Investor column. If applicable, please place an asterisk 
(*) next to the lead investor. 
 












What is the current percentage of corporate ownership held by the following groups:  
 
Founders  Employees Venture “Angel” Strategic Public 
& option pool capitalists  investors investors 
_____% _____% _____% _____%             _____% _____% 
 
 
For the Series A financing, which of the following areas were the subject of active negotiation between 
the parties? 
         Not active   Very active  
Pre-money valuation    N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
Board representation    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee option pool    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Vesting schedules    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Liquidation rights    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Anti-dilution clauses    N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
Other (specify: ____________________)   N/A 1 2 3 4 5   
 




D. Building Corporate Governance 
Number of members of the Board of Directors:  _____ 
 
How many directors are from:  within the firm  _____  outside the firm  ____  
 
Number of board members appointed by your investors: ______ 
 
Please rate the importance of the following functions of your investor-appointed directors: 
 
                   LOW           HIGH 
Oversight and monitoring of the company  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Source of advice and counsel to the company  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Source of external business contacts    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Recruiting and team building    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Market validation/prestige    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Do you have a board of advisors?  Yes  No 
 
Please rate the importance of the following functions of your board of advisors, if you have one: 
 
                   LOW           HIGH 
Oversight and monitoring of the company  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Source of advice and counsel to the company  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Source of external business contacts    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Recruiting and team building    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 




E. Product, Technology, and Strategy 
Which industrial classification best describes your company: 
Internet: Services Internet: E-tailer Internet: Infra.  Internet: Other  
Software   Medical Devices Biotech   Communications 
 Computer hardware Other (specify: _____________________ ) 
 
Year 1  2  3  4  5 
Actual company revenues:  
(Thousands of dollars) 
 
    Year 1  2  3  4  5 
Actual corporate profits/losses:  
 
Number of:  patent applications filed by your firm:  _____   patents pending: _____  
patents issued to your company:  _____ 
 
Has your firm entered into any technology licensing deals?      
Yes: licensed out   Yes: licensed in 
 
If your firm has licensed-out, what were the terms?  Exclusive Non-exclusive 
 
Who were the licensees?  Product market incumbents    Product market entrants 
 
Year 1  2  3  4  5 
Actual licensing revenues by yr:  
(Thousands of dollars) 
 
Has your firm been acquired since its inception?    Yes     No  
If so, by whom? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
At the time of your Series A financing, please rate the importance of each of the following as obstacles to 
the commercial success of your enterprise: 
 
      Not an obstacle  Very important obstacle 
 
Lack of brand name image   N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
Lack of distribution channels/sales force  N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
Lack of servicing resources   N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
Lack of manufacturing capability  N/A 1 2 3 4 5  
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Part II: Financing Offer Characteristics 
 
Please complete one record for each term sheet you received, copying this form as many times as needed. 
If possible, please also attach a copy of the term sheet received from each investor organization. 
 
Name of Investor: _____________________________________________________ 
 
Location (City/State): ___________________________________________________ 
 
How did you make initial contact with this investor? 
  
    Sent an unsolicited business plan 
    He/she was a personal contact 
    Referred by an advisor or friend 
    Other (specify: ________________________________________________ ) 
 
If you were referred to the investor through a friend or knew the investor directly, how did you come to 




Does this investor host a regular conference or formal networking event for top managers of its portfolio 
companies?       Yes   No 
 
Does this investor have dedicated personnel to help its portfolio companies in the following areas: 
 Recruiting    Yes   No 
 Finance & accounting   Yes   No 
 Business development   Yes   No 
 
Please rate this financing offer/investor along the following dimensions:      
                LOW     HIGH 
Overall reputation of this investor   N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Reputation in your industrial sector   N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Expected availability to mentor the team   N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
“Chemistry” with this investor    N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Expected ability to recruit key managers   N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Potential contacts with key customers or suppliers N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
Potential contacts with investment banks  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 
 
What pre-money valuation did this investor assign to your company at the Series A round? 
 $________ Million 
 
What post-money valuation did this investor assign to your company at the Series A round? 
 $________ Million 
 
Proposed equity stake taken by this investor as a result of this financing offer: _______
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Part III: Financing Offer Comparison Table 
 
 Each column lists a dimension of the financing offer. Please COMPARATIVELY RANK your offers along these dimensions. 
(1 = Highest, 2 = Second Highest, etc.) 
 




























EXAMPLE: Financing Offer Comparison 
ABC Vultures 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 
FFAF Funds 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 
Complex Angels 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 3 
FINANCING OFFER COMPARISON RECORD 
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Description of the Overall Dataset 
 
This table describes the overall sample of Series A round financing offers to start-ups. Panel A describes the distribution of 
start-ups by year of incorporation. Panel B describes the overall sample, together with the distribution of offers and 
characteristics of the start-ups. For the sample of single and multiple offers, 80.5% of the 149 firms accepted their best (and 
sometimes only) financing offer. Of the 51 firms receiving multiple offers, 57% did not accept their best financial offer, 
leaving $173.9M “on the table,” the sum of the differences between the best financial offer and the accepted offer. For the 
group of firms receiving multiple offers and declining their best financial offer, this amount represents an average of 33.2% 
pre-money valuation discount as a fraction of their accepted offers. For the overall sample of single and multiple offers, 
this statistic is 12.5%. The measure internet industry includes services, infrastructure, retail, or other; computer industry 
includes software and hardware; health industry includes medical devices and biotechnology. The measure high industry 
deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s 
industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places 
the VC above the sample median. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received 
the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: 
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure corporate 
VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the amount of capital offered (in 
$M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 
30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Panels C and D report the 
conditional means of start-up and VC characteristics, respectively, for the single offer and multiple offer subsamples of the 
dataset. The t-tests of equal means between these sub-samples are also reported. 
 
Panel A. Distribution of number of start-ups by year of incorporation 
 
 1984 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
# 1 1 1 2 5 5 13 14 19 27 39 22 
 
Panel B. Description of start-ups and VCs by number of offers received 
 
 Number of offers received 
Start-up characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum/Avg. 
Number of start-up firms 98 21 20 6 3 0 1 149 
# firms accepting best financial offer 98 9 11 1 1 NA 0 120 
# firms declining best financial offer 0 12 9 5 2 NA 1 29 
% firms accepting best financial offer 100 42.9 55 16.7 33.3 NA 0 80.5% 
$M “left on table” 0 56.5 50.8 42.5 8.8 NA 15.3 $174M 
Accepted pre-money value 869.4 147.3 74.2 256.5 11.3 NA 34.7 1393M 
Foregone value as a % of accepted 
pre-money value 
0 38.4 68.5 16.6 77.9 NA 44.1 12.5% 
Year start-up founded 1997.2 1998.1 1997.6 1997.2 1998.3 NA 1995.0 1997.4 
Year of Series A funding 1998.5 1998.8 1998.8 1999.0 1999.3 NA 1999.0 1998.6 
Pre-money valuation ($M) 8.9 11.3 15.4 48.6 10.9 NA 34.7 11.9 
Pre-Series A employment 9.3 9.4 9.7 23.0 15.7 NA 15.0 10.1 
First year revenues ($M) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.1 NA 0.0 0.3 
# patent app. 12/31/2000 4.9 3.8 7.8 12.2 3.0 NA 2.0 5.4 
# patent grants as of 12/31/2000 1.2 0.5 2.0 0.7 1.0 NA 2.0 1.2 
Internet industry 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 NA 1.0 0.5 
Computer industry 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 NA 0.0 0.2 
Health industry 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.1 
Communications industry 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.1 
Massachusetts-based start-up 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 NA 1.0 0.7 
California-based start-up 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 NA 0.0 0.1 
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Table I – continued 
 
        
 Number of offers received 
VC Characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum/Avg. 
High industry deal experience 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 NA 1.0 0.3 
High normalized funds raised 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.0 NA 1.0 0.7 
High network resources rating 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 NA 1.0 0.4 
Corporate VC 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 
Angel investor 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.2 
Financing offered ($M) 4.3 6.3 6.0 14.3 6.0 NA 13.7 5.3 
Equity taken threshold 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 NA 0.0 0.6 
 
Panel C. Comparison of start-up characteristics across offers received subsamples 
 
Variable Single offer 
mean 
Multiple offer  
mean 
t-stat for equal means 
Year start-up founded 1997.19 1997.77 -1.36 
Year of Series A financing 1998.53 1998.86 -1.18 
Pre-Series A employment 9.32 11.59 -1.31 
First year revenues ($M) 0.23 0.35 -0.86 
# Patent applications as of 12/31/2000 4.94 6.28 -0.62 
# Patent grants as of 12/31/2000 1.21 1.14 0.11 
Internet industry 0.48 0.59 -1.26 
Computer industry  0.24 0.20 0.54 
Health industry  0.09 0.10 -0.12 
Communications industry 0.11 0.10 0.26 
Massachusetts-based start-up 0.72 0.78 -0.79 
California-based start-up 0.13 0.12 0.26 
 
Panel D. Comparison of VC characteristics across offers received subsamples 
 




t-stat for equal  
means 
Pre-money valuation ($M) 8.87 17.73 -2.75*** 
High industry deal experience 0.25 0.51 -3.35*** 
High normalized funds 0.64 0.67 -0.29 
High network resources rating 0.39 0.55 -1.89* 
Corporate VC 0.05 0.02 -2.93*** 
Angel investor 0.22 0.08 2.25** 
Financing offered ($M) 4.33 7.27 -2.43** 




Descriptive Statistics of the Multiple Offers Sample 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of variables used in Tables III through VIII. The measure VC offer accepted 
is a dummy equal to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure pre-money valuation is the product 
of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in 
$M). The measure relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest 
offered valuation received by that start-up. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC 
above the sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with 
lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The 
measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout 
funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure high network 
resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least 
one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and 
suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards of 
directors per general venture capital partner. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a 
corporate VC. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel 
investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the amount of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The 
measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity 
(the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer.  
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Source 
Dependent variables    
   VC offer accepted 0.345 0.477 MIT Survey 
   Pre-money valuation  20.589 32.935 MIT Survey 
   Relative valuation offered 0.826 0.215 MIT Survey 
VC reputation measures    
   High industry deal experience 0.439 0.498 Venture Economics 
   Industry reputation rank 5.905 1.163 MIT Survey 
   High normalized funds raised 0.568 0.497 Venture Economics 
   High network resources rating 0.432 0.497 MIT Survey 
   Boards per general partner 4.198 2.405 Venture Economics 
VC- and financing term controls    
   Corporate VC 0.048 0.214 Corporate web sites 
   Angel investor 0.068 0.253 MIT Survey 
   Financing offered  7.863 8.944 MIT Survey 






Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
 
This table provides a pair-wise correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Statistically significant relationships at the 5% level are denoted 
with an asterisk (*). The measure VC offer accepted is a dummy equal to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure pre-money valuation is the 
product of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in $M). The measure relative valuation 
offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that start-up. The measure high industry deal 
experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the 
sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation 
among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds 
(excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure high network resources rating is a 
dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: 
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of 
boards of directors per general venture capital partner. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure angel investor 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure financing offered is the level of capital offered (in $M) 
by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the 
sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) VC offer accepted 1             
(2) Pre-money valuation -0.05 1           
(3) Relative valuation offered 0.05 0.40* 1          
(4) High industry deal exp. 0.13    0.26*   0.03 1         
(5) Industry rep. rank 0.43*    -0.22*   -0.04   0.12   1        
(6) High norm. funds raised 0.15   -0.25* -0.03 -0.21*  0.06 1       
(7) High network res. rating 0.17* 0.27* -0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.06   1      
(8) Boards per gen. partner 0.12     0.10    -0.06   0.46* 0.25*   0.01 0.05 1     
(9) Corporate VC -0.32* 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.23* 1    
(10) Angel investor -0.10 -0.17* -0.04 -0.24*  -0.05   0.24*   -0.02 -0.21 -0.06 1   
(11) Financing offered -0.05 0.73* 0.21* 0.15 -0.17* -0.26* 0.33* -0.02 -0.10 -0.19* 1  





Univariate Difference in Means Tests 
 
Panel A describes difference in means tests for accepted versus declined financing offers among offers received by 
start-ups with more than one Series A financing offer. The measure pre-money valuation is the product of the 
number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before the financing round (in $M). The 
measure normalized industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has 
previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment per years of operation places the VC above the sample 
median. The measure normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds 
(excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per number of years of operation places the VC above the sample 
median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of seven being first best, with lower values 
indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation in the start-up’s industrial segment among received offers, as rated by 
the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the 
maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: 
Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. Panel B describes 
conditional means of relative valuation offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest 
offered valuation received by that start-up, and equality of means tests for the upper and lower halves (divided at the 
median) of normalized industry deal experience, normalized funds raised, industry reputation rank, and high 
network resources rating.  
 
 
Panel A: Difference in means tests 
 
 Offer accepted Offer not accepted t-stat: equal means 
Pre-money valuation 17.733 22.090 0.764 
Normalized industry deal exp. 3.844 2.810 -1.282 
Normalized funds raised 0.667 0.515 -1.771* 
Industry reputation rank 6.588 5.546 -5.711*** 




Panel B: Conditional means of relative valuation offered 
 
 Top half Bottom half t-stat: equal means 
Normalized industry deal exp. 
0.812 0.844 0.880 
Normalized VC funds raised 
0.820 0.834 0.397 




Relative valuation offered 
0.798 0.843 1.233 
 High network resources rating 
 0.804 0.842 1.070 
 
*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table V 
VC Offer Acceptance Logit Regressions 
 
This table shows start-up fixed-effects logit regressions on a sample of 148 offers across 51 start-ups receiving 
multiple Series A financing offers. Regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses below. 
The dependent variable, VC offer accepted equals 1 if a financing offer was taken and 0 otherwise. The measure 
high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in 
the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure relative valuation 
offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that 
start-up. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum 
Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting 
resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure angel investor 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate 
VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of 
capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 




 Dependent variable = VC offer accepted 














High network resources 
rating 
  1.415*** 
(0.519) 








  -0.450 
(0.972) 
L financing offered 
 
  -0.329 
(0.593) 
Equity taken threshold 
 
  1.015 
(0.851) 
Start-up fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prob>chi2 0.028 0.070 0.016 
Log likelihood -49.195 -48.962 -42.974 
 





This table shows the result of start-up fixed-effects OLS regressions on a sample of 148 offers across 51 start-ups 
receiving multiple Series A financing offers. The unit of observation is an offer to a start-up. Robust standard errors 
(adjusted for clustering by start-up firm) are reported (in parentheses). The dependent variable is relative valuation 
offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered valuation received by that start-
up. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has 
previously funded in the target start-up's industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The measure 
VC offer accepted equals 1 if a financing offer was taken and 0 otherwise. The measure high network resources 
rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the 
following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources, contacts with customers and suppliers, or 
contacts with investment bankers. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is 
from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate 
VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure 
equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the 




 Dependent variable = Relative valuation offered 














High network resources 
rating 
  -0.048 
(0.045) 








  0.016 
(0.110) 
L financing offered 
 
  0.261*** 
(0.054) 
Equity taken threshold 
 
  -0.291*** 
(0.067) 









Adj. R-Squared 0.098 0.094 0.460 
 




Offer Acceptance Robustness Regressions 
 
This table reports robustness checks on VC offer acceptance regressions. Fixed effects logit regressions of VC offer accepted, a dummy equal 
to 1 if an offer was accepted by the entrepreneur, on the sample of multiple offers are found in columns 1 to 3. The measure high industry 
deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment 
places the VC above the sample median. The measure high normalized funds raised is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of prior 
funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the sample median. The measure industry 
reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower reputation) of VC reputation among offers 
received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the maximum 
Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: recruiting resources, contacts with 
customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the average number of boards of 
directors per general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an angel 
investor or angel group. The measure relative valuation offered is the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered 
valuation received by that start-up. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing 
offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Columns 4 and 5 
show start-up fixed-effects Heckman sample selection probits on the entire sample of 246 offers across 149 start-ups receiving Series A 
financing offers. A first stage selection (probit) equation determines the likelihood that a start-up receives multiple financing offers (multiple 
offer). The estimated covariates are: L initial employees, the natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of start-up employees; zero 
patents, a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have assigned patents; and dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the following 
industrial segments: Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices), and computers 
(software and hardware). Dummies for years of Series A investment (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included. The term rho is the correlation 
between error terms of the selection and primary equations; lamba is the inverse Mill’s ratio.  
 
 Dependent variable = VC offer accepted 
 FE Logits 
Multiple-offers sample (N = 148) 
FE Heckman linear prob models 
Entire sample (N = 246) 
Independent variables (7-1) (7-2) (7-3) (7-4) (7-5) 






High normalized funds raised 0.725* 
(0.437) 
    




   




  0.375*** 
(0.104) 
Boards per general  
partner 
  0.000 
(0.001) 
  












































Log likelihood -43.522 -35.754 -47.197 -249.406 -240.326 








*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
Heckman first stage (selection) equation (SE in parentheses): Multiple offer = - 0.262 (0.356) + 0.147 (0.108) L init. emp. –  
0.461 (0.208) Zero patents + 0.663 (0.251) Internet industry + 0.278 (0.362) Health science industry + 0.315 (0.288) 
Computer industry – 0.199 (0.303) Year 1998 – 0.080 (0.266) Year 1999 + 0.292 (0.262) Year 2000 
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Table VIII 
Valuation Robustness Regressions 
 
This table reports robustness checks on relative valuation offered, the offered pre-money valuation to a start-up relative to the highest offered 
valuation received by that start-up. Fixed effects OLS analysis (with robust standard errors) on the sample of multiple offers is reported in 
columns 1 to 3. The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deals the VC has previously 
funded in the target start-up’s industrial segment places the VC above the sample median. The term high normalized funds raised is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the number of prior funds (excluding buyout funds) the VC has raised per years of operation places the VC above the 
sample median. The measure industry reputation rank is the rank (a ranking of 7 being first best, with lower values indicating lower 
reputation) of VC reputation among offers received, as rated by the entrepreneur. The measure VC offer accepted, a dummy equal to 1 if an 
offer was accepted by the entrepreneur. The measure high network resources rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a VC firm received the 
maximum Likert-scale measure (of 5) in at least one of the following entrepreneur-rated VC network resources: Recruiting resources, 
contacts with customers and suppliers, or contacts with investment bankers. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards 
of directors per general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is from an 
angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate VC. The measure L financing 
offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. Columns 4 and 5 
show start-up fixed effects Heckman sample selection probits on the entire sample of 246 offers across 149 start-ups receiving Series A 
financing offers. A first stage selection (probit) equation determines the likelihood that a start-up receives multiple financing offers (multiple 
offer). The estimated covariates are: L initial employees, the natural logarithm of the pre-Series A number of start-up employees; zero 
patents, a dummy equal to 1 if the start-up does not have assigned patents; and dummy variables equal to 1 for each of the following 
industrial segments: Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices), and computers 
(software and hardware). Dummies for years of Series A investment (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included. The term rho is the correlation 
between error terms of the selection and primary equations; lamba is the inverse Mill’s ratio.  
 
 Dependent variable = Relative valuation offered 
 FE OLS regressions 
Multiple-offers sample (N = 148) 
FE Heckmans 
Entire sample (N = 246) 
Independent variables (8-1) (8-2) (8-3) (8-4) (8-5) 






High normalized funds raised 0.061 
(0.042) 
    




   




  -0.048 
(0.031) 
Boards per general  
partner 
  -0.000* 
(0.000) 
  





















































Adj. R squared/LL 0.593 0.471 0.497 -100.045 -57.314 








*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
Heckman first stage (selection) equation (SE in parentheses): Multiple offer = - 0.262 (0.356) + 0.147 (0.108) L init. emp. –  0.461 
(0.208) Zero patents + 0.663 (0.251) Internet industry + 0.278 (0.362) Health science industry + 0.315 (0.288) Computer industry – 





This table reports OLS regressions, and is based on a sample of accepted Series A financing offers of 149 start-ups. 
The unit of observation is an offer to a start-up. The dependent variable is L pre-money valuation, the natural 
logarithm of the product of the number of outstanding shares before the Series A round and the share price before 
the financing round (in $M). The measure high industry deal experience is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
number of deals the VC has previously funded in the target start-up's industrial segment places the VC above the 
sample median in this category. The measure boards per general partner is the number of boards of directors per 
general venture capital partner. The measure angel investor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a financing offer is 
from an angel investor or angel group. The measure corporate VC is a dummy equal to 1 if the VC is a corporate 
VC. The measure L financing offered is the natural logarithm of capital offered (in $M) by the investor. The measure 
equity taken threshold is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor receives at least 30% of start-up equity (the 
median of the sample) as a result of the Series A financing offer. The measure L initial employees is the natural log 
of the number of employees prior to receiving the Series A round. The measure zero patents is a dummy equal to 1 
if the start-up does not have assigned patents. The measure industry effects represent a collection of indicator 
variables for the Internet (infrastructure, retail, and service), health sciences (biotechnology and medical devices), 
and computers (software and hardware) sectors (the communications industry is the excluded industry segment). 
Years of Series A investment dummies (1998, 1999, and 2000) are also included. 
 
 Dependent variable =  
L pre-money valuation 
Independent variables (9-1) (9-2) (9-3) 
VC characteristics    






Boards per general partner   -0.000 
(0.000) 
Angel investor   0.033 
(0.113) 
Corporate VC   -0.056 
(0.173) 
L financing offered 
 
  0.663*** 
(0.039) 
Equity taken threshold   -0.753*** 
(0.072) 
Start-up characteristics    



































R-squared  0.070 0.338 0.820 
    
*, **, or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
